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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------) 
In the Matter of the Estate ) 
) 
of DAVID E. ROSS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
------------~-----------------
No. 16816 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
On July 31, 1980, Respondent filed his brief in 
opposition to Appellants' brief. For purposes of this Reply 
Brief, Appellants have adopted the organization of Respondent 
in order that this Court may be able to more easily compare the 
arguments advanced by Respondent with those offered in rebuttal 
by Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent asserts that five "separate incidents" have 
been omitted from Appellants' Statement of Facts which "had 
significant pursuasive impact on the trial court judge" 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-2). A review of these "incidents," 
however, shows that their inclusion into the record does not 
assist Respondent in any way in establishing an inter vivos gift. 
First, the conversations occurring at the Beneficial Life 
office and Galen Ross' home go to the question of David Ross' 
intent but not to the question of delivery. Since Appellants 
have already conceded the element of intent, such conversation 
is irrelevant. 
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Likewise, the second conversation occurring in 1978 
between the decedent and Dianne Ross Worthen also goes to 
the question of intent and motive but not to proving 
delivery. 
The testimony of Rod Ross that in February of 1978 he 
physically touched some of the stock certificates is also 
irrelevant to delivery. Mr. Ross was unable to identify which 
certificates he touched, did not know which company they were 
issued from and, as later clarified in his testimony, did 
nothing more than to pick them up, look at them, and place them 
down on the desk. He stated: 
I touched at least two of the certificates. 
I picked them up and I noticed on the certi-
ficates that my name had been spelled out 
Earl Roderick Ross and Anita Ross and there 
were asterisks on the certificates. I did not 
pay any special attention to them other than 
picking them up, looking at them at which time 
I placed them back on Dad's desk." (Tr. 283). 
Certainly, as has been discussed previously and as will be 
discussed infra, Respondent's contact with an unknown share 
of stock on this casual basis hardly amounts to a delivery as 
required by law. 
Finally, the events at the Ross Brothers Corporation 
meeting also go to the question of intent and not delivery. 
Admittedly, the decedent made statements to several people 
about his intention of leaving additional shares of stock 
to Respondent. This question is not at issue in this Appeal 
and therefore a redundancy of these statements serve no 
purpose. The Ross Brothers Corporation meeting had no effect 
whatsoever upon the deli very of stock in the other corporations. 
-2-
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For these reasons, therefore, the omitted facts com-
plained about by Respondent were properly left out since 
they serve no useful purpose in this Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Evidence 
and Improperly Applied Utah Law When it Held That the Decedent 
Had Made A Valid Inter Vivos Gift of Stock to His Son, Rod 
Ross. 
Respondent seems to argue in his Brief that once it is 
shown that there is a clear intent for a person to give a gift 
inter vivos that no real evidence of delivery is required or, 
stating it another way, the stronger the person's intent, the 
less evidence is required of a delivery. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 5-6). As this Court correctly noted in the 
Helper State Bank case cited by Respondent (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 6), each case must be examined individually as to the legal 
requirements of delivery. For example, the elements to prove 
delivery of a diamond necklace would be far different from 
that required to show a conveyance of real property, insurance 
proceeds, or bank accounts. 
This Court in the recent case of Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 
P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979) referred to a previous decision of 
this Court in Singleton v. Kelley, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63 
(1922) as to the separate elements of intent and delivery, and 
their relationship to each other. This Court noted the follow-
ing principle: 
I 
[That the courts will carry out the grantor s 
intentions whenever this is possible] is true, 
but without any evidence of delivery, it can be 
-3-
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of no importance whatever what the intentions 
of the granter in this case were. One may 
have an intention to convey his property to 
another, but unless the deed is delivered to 
the grantee or someone for him, title cannot 
pass, and the undelivered deed is a nullity. 
Id. at 66. 
Thus, even if it is assumed that the decedent unrnistakenly 
and clearly intended for Rod Ross to be the recipient of inter 
vivos gifts of stock, this fact is not sufficient to allow a 
gift to be declared without the concurrent showing of a valid 
delivery. 
Respondent contends that the "decedent did everything 
necessary to make complete transfers of the stock on the 
corporate books and records of each corporation" (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 7). Again, Appellants do not disagree with this 
statement, but assert that the mere transfer of stock on the 
corporate books without actual delivery of the stock certifi-
cates themselves to the donee is insufficient as a matter of 
law to constitute delivery. Thus, regardless of the effort 
the decedent took in the corporate books, there was no valid 
gift. 
Respondent also states that since there is no evidence 
that the decedent ever attempted to "undo" these transactions, 
this conclusively shows that the decedent intended on making 
the gifts to Rod (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8). Again, it 
is not a question of intent but is a question of delivery. 
It is not a question of whether the decedent tried to "undo" 
-4-
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the transaction but whether he had the ability and power 
to revoke the gift because the corporate books and safe 
were both under his sole control. Once again, therefore, 
intention is irrelevant to deciding delivery. 
Respondent asserts that some of the certificates were 
actually "physically handed to Rod Ross." (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 8). Again, however, the mere touching of the 
certificate as a curiosity object hardly constitutes the 
requirements of delivery which requires a complete dominion 
and control being surrendered by the donor and acquired by 
the donee. American National Bank v. Robinson, 184 S.W.2d 393 
(Tenn. App. 1948). There was no evidence that Respondent Rod 
Ross was given the certificates by his father and told that 
he could do with them as he pleased. Mere casual observation 
of the certificates in which his father still maintained all 
dominion and control does not constitute a valid delivery. 
Respondent argues that since decedent kept and maintained 
the stock certificates of other members of the family, this 
custodianship somehow validated the delivery of the stock 
certificates to Rod Ross. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9). 
Again, such an argument is without merit. There is no doubt 
but that all of the certificates kept by the decedent were given 
to him by the various owners for him to preserve. In such 
cases no question arose as to proper delivery of the stock 
certificates. In the case of Rod Ross, however, the supposed 
owner of the stock certificates never had actual physical 
-5-
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possession of them nor did he ever authorize his father to keep 
themon his behalf. All that can be said is that the decedent 
on his own initiative kept custody of the stock certificates 
made out to Rod Ross but could have just as easily have des-
troyed such certificates with no legal liability to his son. 
Thus, the decedent's custodianship of family stock does not 
show a delivery of stock to Rod Ross. 
Finally, the fact that Rod Ross received limited cash 
dividends and some stock dividends does not show that he 
owned legal title and interest in the corpus. A person may 
choose to give another person income from property without 
actually giving him the property itself. In Re Busch's Trust, 81 
N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1957). 
For these reasons, Respondent has failed to show any valid 
delivery of the stock certificate under any one of their four 
asserted acts. 
B. Appellants' Statement of the Utah Law of Inter Vives 
Gift is Correct. 
(1) Clear and Convincing Evidence Does Not 
Support the Facts Found by the Lower Court. 
Respondent has characterized two arguments which Appellants 
are asserting in this Appeal. Appellants agree with this 
characterization. (Respondent's Brief, p. llj. Appellants 
assert "that Respondent failed to prove an essential element 
~ 
of his case" which is, of course, delivery. Second, Appellants 
agree "that as a matter of law Respondent did not offer proof 
adequate to satisfy the 'clear and convincing' standard" which 
is also true since there is no clear and convincing evidence 
-6-
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of delivery. 
It would serve no useful purpose to redefine the 
"clear and convincing" standard required in inter vivos 
gift transactions. It is sufficient to state that Respondent 
had the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
a delivery of the stock certificate had occurred utilizing the 
legal principles required for a valid delivery. 
Because Respondent failed to show an actual transfer 
of the stock certificates themselves as required by Utah law, 
Respondent obviously failed to produce the necessary evidence 
required to prove an inter vivos gift. Thus, it is not really 
a matter of the quantum of evidence the lower Court examined 
as to this necessary requirement but is simply that no evidence 
whatsoever was produced by any standard of review. 
(2) Actual Physical Delivery of the Certificates 
is Required for a Valid Inter Vivos Gift of Stock in 
Utah. 
Respondent devotes a large portion of his Brief in the 
citation of cases from other jurisdictions in which it is 
held that the mere transfer of stock on the corporate books 
constitutes a valid delivery (Respondent's Brief, pp. 14-20). 
Again, Appellants do not dispute that there is a split of 
authority in the United States as to whether the transfer 
on corporate books alone constitutes a sufficient delivery. 
Many of the decisions cited by both sides are dependent upon 
the statutory language contained in the state codes. 
As Appellants have noted in their Brief in chief, there 
are numerous cases in other jurisdictions in which it is held 
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that actual delivery of the stock certificate is required 
and that the transfer on corporate books is insufficient. 
See Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-20. 
Appellants do not dispute the cases cited by Respondent 
from other jurisdictions in which corporate book transfers were 
upheld. It would serve no useful purpose to enter into a 
listing contest of cases from other jurisdictions going in both 
directions. However, it is clear from the very authorities 
cited by Respondent that there is a strong and probable 
majority position in support of Appellants' contentions. 
For example, Section 50 of ~8 Am Jur 2d, Gifts, states 
that actual delivery of a stock certificate is necessary in 
ii 
the absence of a constructive delivery of the stock or a delivery 
of the instrument of gift. 
~o 
Section 51, quoted by the Respondent, 
concludes by stating "but where the donor retains dominion 
and control over the stocks, the transfer thereof on the cor-
~~ 
porate books, even though it is coupled with the issuance of a 
new certificate in the donee's name, does not constitute the 
necessary delivery to effect a valid gift." Id. at p. 858. 
The annotation cited by Respondent also supports the 
contentions of Appellants. It is stated in the annotation, 
for example: 
Where the donor continued to have access to the 
safe deposit box, or other receptacle, in 
which the stock certificate, alleged to have 
been given, was placed, it has been held that 
the gift was incomplete, for lack of the 
necessary delivery or relinquishment of owner-
ship and control by the donor. 23 ALR 2d. 1171, 
1184. 
-8-
~· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Similarly, this same source states: 
Where the donor retains dominion and control 
over the stocks, it has been held that the 
transfer thereof on the corporate books, 
though coupled with the issuance of a new 
certificate in the donee's name, does not 
constitute the necessary delivery to effect 
a valid gift. Id. at 1188. · 
Regardless of the law in other states, however, it is 
clear that in Utah a valid delivery can only arise by the actual 
physical transfer and endorsement of the stock certificate. The 
three Utah cases previously cited by Appellants and referred 
to by Respondent (Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14) all support the 
principle that it is the delivery of the stock certificate and 
not changes in the corporate books which transfers legal title 
of stock. Respondent's attempt to distinguish these cases is 
groundless. 
The case of Sims v. George, 466 P.2d 831 (Utah 1970) further 
supports this position since in that case the stock certificate 
had been physically delivered to the defendant with the 
appropriate endorsement even though the stock was not transferred 
on the company books. This Court noted that the certificates 
were given to the donee and that he was "free to do with them 
as he chose." Id. at 833. In the instant case, however, Rod 
Ross could do nothing with his supposed stock interest since 
he never had possession of the stock certificates which would 
have allowed him to sell, obtain a loan on, or otherwise 
utilize his alleged stock interest. 
Thus, the only decisions of this Court concerning the 
transfer of stock unanimously and clearly hold that it is the 
-9-
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stock certificate which evidences title and not the transfer 
in the corporate books. Since stock is "personal property," 
Brown v. Wright, 161 P. 448 (Utah 1916), it is as 
necessary to delivery the stock certificates to a donee as it 
would be a diamond necklace or set of golf clubs. 
This is especially true in light of the mandatory Utah 
statute dealing with stock transfers. 
(3) Commercial Statutes Control the Law of 
Inter Vives Gifts. 
Respondent asserts that "commercial statutes" in other 
~: 
states "are not controlling on the issue of what acts are ~ 
sufficient for delivery of a gift." Again, Appellants do :1: 
not dispute that cases in other jurisdictions distinguish ~ 
commercial transactions. (Respondent's Brief, p. 21). 
However, there are numerous other cases from jurisdictions :; 
previously cited by Appellants (Appellants' Brief, p. 22) ~ 
and from Respondent's ov."11 cited sources (23 ALR 2d. 1171, ·1l~ 
1194-1197) which hold that courts will follow the commercial )~ 
statutes in determining whether a valid delivery of a gift has 
been made. 
In Utah, it is crystal clear that the Utah Legislature 
has intended delivery in commercial transactions to be 
deemed to have occurred when the actual physical possession of 
a stock certificate has been relinquished. 
Section 70A-8-309, u.c.A., specifically states that a 
transfer does not occur even after a stock certificate has be~ 
-10-
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endorsed until "delivery of the security on which (the 
endorsement) appears." 
Likewise, Section 70A-8-313, U.C.A., states "delivery 
to a purchaser occurs when (a) he or a person designated 
by him acquires possession of a security." Finally, Section 
70A-8-314, U.C.A., states that a transferor's duty to 
deliver a security is not fulfilled "until he places the 
security in form to be negotiated by the purchaser in 
possession of the purchaser." 
It should be noted that in 1977 the Commission on 
Uniform Laws substantially amended the Uniform Act and speci-
fically amended both Section 8-313 and 8-314. A copy of the 
proposed amendment is included herein as appendix. The 
amendment specifically provided, for the first time, for the 
transfer of "uncertificated securities" which provided that 
upon the entry of changes in the corporates books a transfer 
was deemed to have occurred. In the case of certificated 
securities, however, the act still required actual possession 
of the certificate. 
Although the Utah Legislature extensively amended 
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1977, it did not 
amend Section 8-313 or Section 8-314. This failure to amend 
clearly shows the Legislature did not want to deviate from 
the present law in which stock certificates were required and 
in which actual change of possession was mandated. 
Respondent argues that the case of Jackson v. James, 
89 P.2d 235 (Utah 1939) shows that this Court will not look 
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to commercial statutes in deciding gift requirements. 
However, an examintion of that case, a subsequent case, 
and the principles involved shows that this assertion is 
incorrect. 
In Jackson, a defendant was given actual physical 
possession of a Dodge coupe as a wedding present. The plaintiff 
claimed that the car had not been properly registered with t~ 
state and, therefore, title had not transferred. This Court 
WI 
noted that the applicable sections of the Automobile Act cited 
by plaintiff were not construed as an absolute and mandatory 
requirement to pass title. This Court found that the Act 
only applied in certain instances. It also found "that as 
between the parties to the transaction" the statute was never 
intended on governing transfer of ownership. 
In the subsequent case of Jones v. Cook, 223 P.2d 423 
(Utah 1950) another case arose as to whether the gift of an 
automobile had been made to a son of the decedent prior to his 
death. In that case, the automobile was maintained in the 
decedent's garage and the certificate of ownership still 
remained in the name of the decedent. The Court in distin-
guishing Jackson noted that in the Jones case the donor had 
not divested himself of all dominion and control over the 
property. Instead, the decedent was only letting the son 
have the use of the car during the father's lifetime to the 
-12-
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extent it would not inrefere with the decedent's enjoyment. 
Thus, in Jack$on the automobile itself was clearly given 
and retained by the donee even though the official title 
had not been transferred. On the other hand, in Jones, the 
automobile was still under the control of the donor and the 
title was still in the donor's name. 
It is evident that in the case of an automobile the 
actual physical possession and control is the governing 
consideration as opposed to state title. Clearly, as between 
the parties, the actual transfer of the automobile constitutes 
a sufficient delivery regardless of the transfer of the state 
title. 
Corporate stock is also personal property. The only 
way in which it can be effectively delivered is by means of 
the stock certificate. The delivery of the stock certificate 
an analagous to the delivery of the automobile. The 
transfer of the stock in the corporate books is analagous to the 
transfer of the title with the state. In both cases, it is 
actual physical delivery and not the paper transaction which 
is controlling. 
Just as this Court held in Jackson that the passage of 
state title was not controlling as between the parties, the 
change of corporate title is not controlling as between the 
parties in the sale or gift of corporate stock. Rather, it is 
the actual change of physical possession of the stock certifi-
cate between the parties which governs. Rasmussen v. Sevier 
-13-
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Valley Canal Compqny, 121 P. 741 (Utah 1912). 
Another authority has stated this rule as follows: 
[A] transfer of a certificate of stock on 
the books of a corporation to the name of the 
donee is generally held not to be a requisite 
of a valid, completed gift of corporate stock 
as between the parties • • • • In many cases 
the courts, without discussing the necessity 
of a transfer on the books of the corporation, 
have held that an effective gift of stock may 
be made either by delivery of the stock or by 
assignment. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 49, 
Gifts, p. 854. 
Thus, the Jackson case cited by Respondent is actually 
authority against his position. It is clear that in Utah 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the decisions of this Court 
mandate that a proper delivery of stock can only be made 
when the dominion and control of the stock certificate itself 
is given up by the donor and given to the donee unconditionally 
so that the donee may use the stock as if it were his own. 
~i 
In this case, there would clearly be no valid "sale" ~ 
of the stock under the Uniform Commercial Code and since the lli1 
burden of proving a gift is much greater than a sale, there is llii 
certainly no evidence permitting a finding that a valid gift 
was made. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that the question of what is required to 
constitute a valid gift of corporate stock is one of first 
., 
impression in Utah. The elements of a gift, however, and the la\ltl1 
concerning stock transfer is well-established. The solution to 11 
the problem merely requires a "mixing" of the two legal concepts. 
-14-
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If it is assumed that the decedent intended on giving 
Respondent additional shares of stock from the other children, 
the first element of a gift has been met. While Appellants 
believethere is conflicting evidence as to his variable intent, 
Appellants concede there was enough evidence for the lower 
court to find such intent. 
The second element -- valid delivery -- is not present 
even viewing the facts most favorably to Respondent. The 
decedent had control and dominion over all of the corporate 
books and records. He had control over the stock certificates 
that could be issued. He had control over the safe in which 
the certificates were kept. Respondent had control over none 
of these things. 
In this particular case, therefore, there was nothing to stop 
the decedent from changing his mind in the future and reissuing 
the stock in his own name. The Respondent was not even aware 
that a change had been made in the certificate and was unaware 
of the location of the certificates. 
The purpose of requiring unconditional delivery is to prevent 
a decedent from "hedging" -- i.e., claiming the benefits of a 
gift while actually keeping the property himself. The law is 
clear that an inter vivos gift to one heir must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence because of the severe effect such 
a gift can have on family harmony and basic fairness. 
In the case of stock certificates, it is no more difficult 
for a donor to physically give to the donee a stock certificate 
than it is a car, necklace or other item of personal property. 
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The donee, at that moment in time, can require the corporation 
to transfer the stock in his own name. The converse, however , 
is not true since a corporation is not required to issue stock 
certificates even if the books have been changed until the 
donee can show a right to receive such shares, including a bona ! 
fide delivery of the certificate. 
Respondent wishes this Court to impose one standard on 
commercial transactions (actual physical delivery and endorse-
ment of the certificate as required by the U.C.C.) and a 
different standard for gifts of the same stock (change on 
the books only). Certainly there should be only one standard 
and, in any event, the standard for a gift should be stricter 
than a sale not easier. 
For these reasons it is apparent that the alleged inter 
vivos gift of stock by decedent to Rod Ross is invalid as 
a matter of law and the judgment of the lower court should 
be reversed. 
-16-
Respectfully submitted, 
MAX WHEELER 
~bd! 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Ross II and 
Betsy Ross Rapp 
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§ 8-313. When [Delivery] Transfer to [the] Purcha~er 
Occurs: [; Purchaser's Broker] Financial In-
termediary as [Holder) Bona Fide Purchaser; 
"Financial Intermediary" 
(1) [Delivery] Transfer of a security or a limited interest 
(including a security interest) therein to a purchaser occurs 
only [when]_;_ 
(a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires 
possession of a certificated security; [or] 
(b) at the time the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncer-
tificated security is registered to him or a person des-
ignated by him; 
(c) [(b)] at the time his [broker] financial intermediary 
-- acquires possession of a certificated security specially 
indorsed to or issued in the name of the purchaser; [or] 
(d) [(c)] at the time [his broker] a financial intermedi-
ary, not a clearing corporation, sends him confirma-
tion of the purchase and also by book entry or other-
wise identifies [a specific security in the broker's pos-
session] as belonging to the purchaser [; or] 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 8-313 APPENDIX I 
"(i) a specific certificated security in the financial in-
termediary's possession ; 
~ii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part 
of a fungible bulk of certificated securities in the 
financial intermediary's possession or of uncer-
tificated securities registered in the name of the 
financial intermediary; or 
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are 
part of a fungible bulk of securities shown on the 
account of the financial intermediary on the hooks 
of another financial intermediary; 
( e) [ ( d)] with respect to an identified certificated se-
curity to be delivered while still in the possession of a 
third person, not a financial intermediary, [when] at the 
time that person acknowledges that he holds for the 
purchaser; [or] 
(f) with respect to a specific uncertificated security the 
pledge or transfer of which has been regist~red to a. 
third person, not a financial intermediary, at the time 
that person acknowledges that he holds for the pur-
chaser; 
(g) [ (e)] at the time appropriate entries to the accou_nt 
of the purchaser or a person designated by him_ on the 
books of a clearing corporation are made under Sec-
tion 8-320 [.]..i_ 
(h) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where 
the debtor has signed a security agreement containin~ :i 
description of the security, at the time a written noti-
fication, which, in the case of the creation of the se-
curity interest, is signed by the debtor (which may be 
a copy of the security agreement) or which, in the case 
of the release or assignment of the security interest 
created pursuant to this paragraph, is signed by the 
secured party, is received by 
(i) a financial intermediary on whose books the in-
terest of the transferor in the security appears: 
(ii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, in 
possession of the security, if it is certificated; 
(iii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who 
is the registered owner of the security, if it is nn-
certificated and not subject to a registered pledge; 
or 
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1977 AMENDMENTS § 8-313 
(iv) a third person, not a financial intermediarv who 
is the registered pledgee of the securitv ii it is 
uncertificated and subject to a register~ci pledge; 
(i) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where 
the transferor has signed a security agreement coll-
taining a description of the security, at the time new 
value is given by the secured party; or 
(j) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where 
the secured party is a financial intermediary and the 
security has already been transferred to the financial 
intermediary under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), or 
(g), at the time the transferor has signed a security 
agreement containing a description of the security 
and value is given by the secured party. 
(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him 
by [his broker] a financial intermediary, but [is not the holder] 
cannot be a bona fide purchaser of a security so held except [as] 
in the circumstances specified in [subparagraphs] paragraphs 
[(b)] (c), (d) (i), and [(e)] (g) of subsection (1). [Where] If 
a security so held is part of afungible bulk, as in the circuffi-
stances specified in paragraphs (d) (ii) and (d) (iii) of subsec-
tion ( 1), the purchaser is the owner of a proportionate property 
interest in the fungible bulk. 
(3) Notice of an adverse claim received by the [broker] fi-
nancial intermediary or by the purchaser after the [broker] fi-
nancial intermediary takes delivery of a certificated security 
as a holder for value or after the transfer, pledge, or release of 
an uncertificated security has been registered free of the claim 
to a financial intermediary who has given value is not effective 
either as to the [broker] financial intermediary or as to the 
purchaser. However, as behveen the [broker] financial inter-
mediary and the purchaser the purchaser may demand [delivery] 
transfer of an equivalent security as to which no notice of [an] 
adverse claim has been received. 
( 4) A "financial intermediary" is a bank, broker, clearing 
corporation or other person (or the nominee of any of them) 
which in the ordinary course of its business maintains security 
accounts for its customers and is acting in that capacity. A fi-
nancial intermediary may have a security interest in securities 
held in account for its customer. 
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§ 8-314. Duty to (Deliver] Transfer, When Completed 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, [\\.·here] if a sale of a security 
is made on an exchange or otherwise through brokers_:_ 
(a) the selling customer fulfills his duty to [deliYer when] 
transfer at the time he: 
(i) [he] places [such] a certificated security in the 
- possession of the selling broker or of a person 
designated by the broker; [or if requested causes 
an acknowledgment to be made to the selling 
broker that it is held for him; and] 
(ii) causes an uncertificated security to be registered 
in the name of the selling broker or a person des-
ignated by the broker; 
(iii) if requested, causes an acknowledgment to be made 
to the selling broker that [it] a certificated or un-
certificated security is held for [him; and] the 
(iv) 
broker; or -
places in the possegsion of the selling broker or of 
a person designated by the broker a transfer in-
StfUction for an uncertificated security, providing 
the issuer does not refuse to register the request-
ed transfer if the instruction is presented to the 
issuer for registration within 30 days thereafter; 
and 
(b) the selling broker, including a correspondent broker 
acting for a selling customer, fulfills his duty to [de-
liver] transfer at the time he:-
Jil [by placing the] places a certific::tted security [or 
a like security] in the possession of the buying 
broker or a person designated by [him or] the 
buying broker; -
(ii) causes an uncertificated security to be registered 
in the name of the buying broker or a person des-
ignated by the buying broker; 
_(iii) placeR in the possession of the buying broker or 
of a person designated by the buyin-g broker a 
transfer instruction for an uncertificated security, 
pro\'iding the issuer does not refuse to register 
the requested transfer if the instruction is pre-
sented to the issuer for registration within 30 
days thereafter; or 
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§ 8-314 APPENDIX I 
(iv) [by effecting] effects clearance of the sale in ac-
cordapce with the rules of the exchange on which 
the transaction took place. 
(2) Except as [othenvise] provided in this section and unless 
otherwise agreed, a transferor's duty to [deliver] transfer a se-
curity under a contract of purchase is not fulfilled until he: 
(a) [he] places [the] a certificated security in form to be 
negotiated by the purchaser in the possession of the 
purchaser or of a person designated by the purchaser; 
[him or at the purchaser's request causes an acknowl-
edgment to be made to the purchaser that it is held for 
him.] 
(b) causes an uncertificated security to be registered in 
the name of the purchaser or a person designated by 
the purchaser; or 
(c) [at the purchaser's request] if the purchaser requests, 
causes an acknowledgment to be made to the purchaser 
that [it] a certificated or uncertificated security is held 
for [him] the purchaser. 
(3) Unless made on an exchange, a sale to a broker purchas-
ing for his own account is within [this] subsection (2) and not 
within subsection ( 1). 
Reasons for 1977 Change 
This section presently provides that a transferor's duty is 
fulfilled by physical delivery of a certificated security. This 
rule is preserved in subparagraphs (1 )(a)(i), (1 )(b)(i) and 
(2)(a). New subparagraphs (l)(a)(ii), (l)(b) (ii) and (2) 
(b) permit the transferor also to perform by causing the reg-
istration of transfer of an uncertificated security to tile trans-
feree or his designee. Another alternative, causing a third 
party holder to acknowledge that he holds for the transferee 
if the transferee so requests, is provided in the present sec-
tion and is explicitly stated in new subparagraphs (1 )(a) 
(iii) and (2)(c). A selling broker may also fulfill his duty 
by effecting clearance pursuant to exchange rules. This is 
stated in new subparagraph (i)(b)(iv). 
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